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of a crawling peg, banks go bankrupt, the domestic interest rate rises, real wages fall, and output
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In the post Bretton Woods era currency crises have often coincided with banking
crises. Prominent examples include Southeast Asia in 1997, Chile in 1982, Mexico
in 1994, and Sweden and Finland in 1992.1 There are four common elements in
such dual' crises. First, there are implicit government guarantees to domestic and
foreign bank creditors. Second, banks do not generally hedge exchange rate risk
and many go bankrupt following a currency devaluation. Third, there is a lending
boom before the crisis. Finally, currency collapses that coincide with banking
crises are typically associated with a rise in interest rates on domestic loans and
a persistent declille in output. This paper attempts to provide an interpretation
of why dual crises share these common elements.
To this end, we study the connection between government guarantees to foreign
lenders, banks' hedging strategies and the aggregate level of economic activity.
We consider two types of risk associated with exchange rate devaluations. The
first type arises when banks borrow foreign currency, say dollars, and make loans
denominated in units of the local currency. A second type arises when devaluations
are associated with higher default rates on bank loans. This risk can exist even
when banks make loans denominated in dollars. This is because these loans are
often used to fund concerns that produce nontraded goods whose relative prices
decline after a currency devaluation.2
In our model, absent government guarantees, it is optimal for banks to fully
'Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) study empirically the link between banking and currency
crises. See Diaz.-Alejandro (1985) and Nyberg and Vihriälä (1993) for analyses of the 1982
Chilean and 1992 Finnish crises, respectively. Garber and Lall (1998) and Krueger and Tornell
(1999) discuss the 1994 Mexican crisis.
2For example Gavin and Hausmann (1996) write that "...duringthe years leading up to the
Chilean banking crisis (1982), banks were permitted to borrow in foreign currency but prohibited
from taking the exchange risk, so that lending funded by international borrowing was required
to be denominated in foreign currency. This was supposed to transfer the currency risk from
banks to the nonfinancial firms to which banks made loans, but after the unexpected devaluation
many firms found themselves unable to repay their loans in full or on time. Thus, the exchange
rate risk that faced nonfinancial firms was to an extent borne by the banking systems in the
form of credit risk."
2hedge exchange rate risk in forward markets. This is true regardless of which type
of exchange rate risk banks face. However, the presence of government guarantees
completely eliminates banks' incentives to hedge the risk of a devaluation. Indeed,
it is optimal for banks to magnify their exchange rate exposure by selling dollars
forward, so that they lose money when there is a devalilation. To the extent that
banks are prevented from doing this, say by government regulation, our results
provide a theory for why forward markets would not exist: in fixed exchange
rate economies with government guarantees banks have no desire to buy dollars
forward.
To study the macroeconomic effects of government guarantees we embed our
model of banking into a general equilibrium environment which has two key fea-
tures. First, firms in the output sector must borrow working capital from banks to
pay labor. So from firms' perspective, the marginal cost of an extra unit of labor
is the gross interest rate on bank loans times the real wage.3 Other things equal
this means that a lower gross interest rate on domestic loans raises the demand
for labor. Second, there is a fixed exogenous probability that the economy will
permanently shift from a fixed exchange rate regime to one in which the exchange
rate depreciates at a constant rate.
Prior to a devaluation, government guarantees to bank creditors lower the
domestic interest rate and raise aggregate output, employment, real wages, the
number of banks and the number of firms in the output sector. Thus the guar-
antees generate what appears to be a boom. But they also lead to a more fragile
banking system. Banks do not hedge exchange rate risk. When a devaluation
occurs, they renege on foreign debt and go bankrupt. At the same time, the
devaluation leads to a permanent rise in the domestic interest rate and a perma-
nent fall in aggregate output, employment, real wages, the number of banks, and
the number of goods producing firms. Economies with and without government
guarantees respond in the same way to a devaluation. But since an economy with
31n this respect our setup is similar to Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) who emphasize
the importance of the working capital channel in the monetary transmission mechanism.
3guarantees has a lower interest rate and a higher level of output to begin with,
a devaluation leads to a relatively large rise in the interest rate and a relatively
large fall in economic activity.
Given the central role that government guarantees play in our model, it is
useful to provide intuition for how they affect the optimal hedging strategies of
banks. The government guarantees that foreign creditors will receive R*, the world
gross risk-free interest rate, in the event that there is a devaluation and banks
default on their debt. Suppose a bank contemplates hedging foreign exange rate
risk via forward contracts. The profits which are realized from these contracts
in devaluation/bankruptcy states are seized by the government, so the banks
assign zero value to them. But these contracts generate losses when there is no
devaluation and the bank does not go bankrupt. It follows that banks have no
incentive to buy forward contracts that generate positive payoffs when there is a
devaluation.
The previous analysis implies that banks will not be perfectly hedged, and that
they will go bankrupt when a devaluation occurs. To the extent that they have
any assets in that state of the world, a portion of their value will be dissipated
in bankruptcy proceedings. Hence banks ought to minimize their asset holdings
in bankruptcy states of the world. A simple strategy for doing this is to sell
dollars forward, which generates profits in the no devaluation state and losses
in the devaluation state. Evidently in the presence of government guarantees
it is optimal for banks to engage in hedging strategies that might be naively
characterized as reckless speculation.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide empirical motivation
for our analysis. Section 3 lays out a competitive banking model. The key features
of this model are that there is free entry and exit, and industry wide demand for
loans is a decreasing function of the interest rate. Banks face exchange rate risk
which they have an incentive to hedge because of bankruptcy costs. Section 4
studies banks' decisions to hedge exchange rate risk in a setting where the level of
loans is predetermined with respect to the hedging decision. We study economies
4with and without government guarantees to bank creditors. In Section 5 we
characterize the equilibrium of the banking industry when lending and hedging
decisions are made simultaneously. Section 6 discusses the effects of introducing
capital requirements and government guarantees that are not contingent on a
devaluation. In Section 7westudy a version of the model where banks lend to
domestic firms in dollars but face uncertainty with respect to loan repayment
rates in the event of a devaluation. In Section 8 we embed our ba king model
in a general equilibrium environment and study the macroeconomic effects of
government guarantees and devaluations. Section 9 contains concluding remarks.
2. Empirical Motivation
In the introduction we noted that there are important common elements in episodes
where banking crises are associated with currency crises. Three of these elements
have been extensively documented in the literature: (i) there are implicit gov-
ernment guarantees to domestic and foreign bank creditors prior to the currency
crises;45 (ii) there is a rise in domestic interest rates and a fall in aggregate eco-
nomic activity after a currency collapse;6 (iii) the crisis is preceeded by a lending
boom .
Thefinal common element in banking/currency crises is that firms and finan-
cial intermediaries borrow extensively from abroad but do not completely hedge
4lndeed Mishkin (1996) and Obstfeld (1998) argue that in many cases a government's promise
to maintain the exchange rate fixed is seen as providing an implicit government guarantee to
bank depositors and foreign lenders against a possible devaluation.
5See the references in the introduction. In addition, see IMF (1998, page 35) and IMF (1999,
page 21) for a discussion of guarantees in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Korea as well as
Deihaise (1998). IMF (1998, page 39) details the extent to which implicit guarantees became
explicit after the crises occurred. Drees and Pazarba.ioglu (1998) discuss government guarantees
in the Nordic country banking crises, while Calomiris (1998) discusses foreign bank creditor bail
outs after the 1994 Mexican currency crises.
6See for example the IMF World Economic Outlook and International Capital Markets (var-
ious years).
7See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Gavin and Hausmann (1996), and Drees, Burkhard and
Pazarba.iol (1998).
5exchange rate risk. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, there is little for-
mal empirical work measuring exchange rate exposure. One way to assess the
potential magnitude of this exposure is to consider banks', firms' and financial
intermediaries' net foreign assets prior to the onset of a crisis. There are two
sources of data for doing this: the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) and
the International Financial Statistics (IFS). An important advantage of the BIS
data is that it is based on reports from major OECD banks. To the extent that
accounting standards for banks in OECD countries are more standardized and
carefully enforced than in non-OECD countries, the BIS data may be more reli-
able than the IFS data. This is because the latter are based, in part, on reports
from agents in non-OECD countries who are borrowing funds. In addition, there
are subtle ambiguities about how a given transaction might be reported in the
IFS data. Suppose for example that Bank A in Country X borrows dollars from
abroad and uses the proceeds to make dollar denominated loans to local firms.
Bank A may take the position that this transaction does not cause a decline in
its net foreign assets and would not report it as such. However, the transaction
does expose the bank to the second type of exchange rate risk discussed in the
introduction, namely the increase in loan default rates that often occurs after a
devaluation. Since the BIS data are based on reports from the foreign creditors
of Bank A (assuming that they are banks in OECD countries) the transaction
would show up as a decrease in the net foreign assets of banks in Country X.
The advantage of the IFS data is that they are more comprehensive in coverage.
The BIS data are based solely on reports from banks that are part of its system,
so that if Bank A borrowed money from a foreign corporation or a non-BIS bank,
the transaction would not be reflected in the BIS data. With these limitations in
mind, we now report results based on both the BIS and IFS data.
Table 1 presents data on the net foreign assets of banks and firms based on
BIS data, and the net foreign assets of deposit money banks (DMB) and other
financial intermediaries (OFT) based on IFS data. We do this for various countries
prior to the onset of currency/banking crises. A number of interesting features
6emerge from the table. First, in all cases, firms and banks in these countries had
significant net foreign debt at the time of their crises. For the Nordic countries, the
IFS data indicate a much larger net negative position than the BIS data. This
may reflect that deposit money banks in the Nordic countries were borrowing
substantial amounts of funds from entities other than BIS banks. For the East
Asian countries we find that the BIS data indicate a much larger negative net
position than the IFS data. This may reflect accounting problems with the data
reported to the IFS by these countries.
The table pertains to levels of net foreign assets immediately prior to the crises.
In most cases, these levels were achieved as the result of significant declines of
net financial asset holdings in the preceding years. For example, in discussing
Asia crises countries, Jackson (1999) writes: ".. . banksin each country rapidly
increased their net foreign liabilities by large percentages during the four years
prior to the crisis." The IMF World Economic Outlook and International Capital
Iviarkets (various years) document similar behavior in other crisis countries.
While highly suggestive, Table 1 can only establish that financial institutions
had large exchange rate exposure in their loan portfolios. However, this exposure
could, in principle, have been hedged. Given data limitations, it is not possible to
precisely measure the extent to which large net foreign asset positions were hedged
in the different crisis countries. Still, many qualitative analyses suggest that they
were unhedged. For example, IMF (1999, p. 17) concludes that Indonesia, Korea
and Thailand had "large unhedged private short-term foreign currency debt in a
setting where corporations were highly geared; in Korea and Thailand, this debt
was mainly intermediated through the banking system, while in Indonesia the
corporations had heavier direct exposures to such debt." Folkerts-Landau et al.
7Table 1














Thailand -48.9-7.0 -22.8 -2.7
(1997, p. 46) write, with reference to Thailand, "While banks are believed to
have hedged most of their net foreign liabilities, the opposite is believed to be
true for the corporate sector. The combination of a stable exchange rate and
a wide differential between foreign and (much higher) domestic interest rates
provided a strong incentive for firms to take on foreign currency liabilities.
Hence, in addition to their own foreign exchange exposure, banks may have a
large indirect exposure in the form of credit risk to firms that have borrowed in
foreign currencies."9
8BIS measures of NFA are end-of-quarter. For the Nordic countries, 1991Q3, for Mexico,
1994Q3, for East Asia, 1997Q2. The IFS measures of NFA are end-of-year. For the Nordic
countries, 1990, for Mexico, 1993, for East Asia 1996. DMB: Deposit Money Banks. OFI: Other
Financial Institutions.
9See also Eichengreen and Fishlow (1998).
83. A Model of Banking in an Small Open Economy
We begin our theoretical analysis by studying a partial equilibrium model of banks
in a small open economy. By assumption there is a single consumption good and
no barriers to trade, so that purchasing power parity holds:
Pt = (3.1)
Here Pt and P denote the domestic and foreign price level respectively, while St
denotes the exchange rate defined as units of domesticcurrency per unit of foreign
currency. For convenience we normalize the foreign price level to one: P =1for
all t.
We assume that the exchange rate regime, et,followsa Markov chain. The
economy is initially in a fixed exchange rate regime, et= 1,with exchange rate
S =s1. Theeconomy can switch to a devaluation regime, et =2,which is an
absorbing state. The probability transition matrix is given by:
T—'0 1.
where p =Pr(et=2Iet = 1),is the probability of switching from the fixed
exchange rate regime to the devaluation regime.
When the exchange rate is devalued the exchange rate depreciates to some
value s2ys1, 'y> 1, and then follows a crawling peg in which the currency
continues to depreciate at the rate 'y.'° To summarize, the exchange rate, S, is
given by:
Siife=1
S 'ys1ifet= 2andet_i =1 (3.2)
yS_1 ifet= et_i=2.
10The analysis can be generalized to the case where there is more than one possible value of
.s in the event of a devaluation. To preserve the possibility of full hedging would require more
complex hedging strategies than the ones considered here. In particular we would require an
exotic security with payoffs a + b/S in the devaluation state.
9Since we focus on banks' hedging strategies prior to the devaluation, wesuppress
time subscripts throughout much of the rest of the paper.
3.1. The Banking Sector
To be in the banking business requires an investment of K units of output at the
beginning of every period. If the bank does not exit the industry by the end of the
period it recoups (1 —ö)Kunits of its capital investment. Here 6 represents the
rate of depreciation on capital. If the bank does exit, it cannot retrieve any of its
initial capital investment. Since capital can be invested in world capital markets,
the per period opportunity cost of entering the banking industry is R*K. Here
R* is the gross interest rate on foreign currency, i.e. dollar-denominated loans in
the world capital market.11
To make our argument as simply as possible we abstract from the role of banks
as producers of information and focus directly on the real costs of making loans.'2
By assumption, the real cost of lending L units of output is '(L). The function
'(L) is positive, twice continuously differentiable and convex, so that the marginal
cost of making loans is increasing.
Throughout we assume that banks are perfectly competitive. As discussed in
the introduction, evidence from recent currency crises indicates that banks are
exposed to different types of exchange rate risk. In this section we concentrate
on the risk that arises when banks borrow foreign currency at a gross interest
rate Rb,whileissuing non-indexed loans to domestic firms that are to be repaid
in local currency units at a gross interest rate R. To simplify the analysis we
abstract from the possibility that banks borrow funds from domestic residents.
Instead we assume that banks finance themselves entirely by borrowing L dollars
"It would be straightforward to extend our analysis to allow for long lived banks. In partic-
ular, our results would continue to hold if banks had to pay a sunk cost to enter the industry,
provided that the devaluation is large enough to generate exit.
'2For a similar model see Chari, Christiano an Eichenbaum (1996) and Edwards and Vegh
(1997). For alternative models of the role of banks in currency crises see, for example, Akerlof
and Romer (1993), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1998) and Chang and Velasco (1999).
10in the international capital market. These funds are converted into units of local
currency at the exchange rate S. Banks can hedge exchange rate risk by entering
into forward contracts.'3 Let F denote the one-period forward exchange rate
defined as units of local currency per dollar. By assumption these contracts are
priced in a risk neutral manner, so that:
=(1-p)-- +p--. (3.3)
Dollar-denominated profits, r, inclusive of end-of-period capital, can be writ-
ten as a function of the exchange rate and the borrowing rate:
(S, Rb)=RasiLRbL —(L)+ (1 —)K+ —). (3.4)
Here x denotes the number of units of local currency sold by the bank in the
forward market.
Banks can default on loans contracted in the international capital market. It
is optimal for banks to default in states of the world where ir is negative. The
cost of default is w+A[RasiL/S —(L)+ (1 —)K+ x(1/F —1/S)].Here
represents fixed costs associated with bankruptcy and A represents the fraction of
the remaining gross assets of the bank that are dissipated upon default.'4 Assets
net of bankruptcy costs, (1 —A)[RasiL/S
—/(L)+ (1 —ö)K+ x(1/F —1/S)]
—
aredistributed to the bank's international creditors. Here we have assumed that
forward contracts must be settled before the bank's foreign creditors are paid.
The expected profit of a bank that defaults whenever ir(S, Rb) <0is
V =(1_p)m x{7r(s,,Rb),0} +pmaxfr(s2,Rb),0}. (3.5)
In the absence of loan guarantees, Rb is determined by the condition that the
expected return to international creditors equals R*.
'3See Albuquerque (1999) for a general discussion of optimal hedging strategies, including the
choice between forwards and options as hedging instruments.
'4As will be clear from our analysis below, when wiszero agents are indifferent between
various hedging strategies. A positive wservesthe role of a 'tie breaker'.
11If ir(si, Rb) <0 and ir(s2,Rb)> 0, then
R*L__PRbL+(1_P){(1_A) [RaL_(L)+(1_6)K+x(_) _}. Fs1
(3.6)
If ir(s1,Rb) > 0and 7r(s2,Rb)< 0, then
R*L =(1_p)RbL+p{(1 —) [RaL
—(L)+ (1— )K + —)] —
(3.7)
Equation (3.6) applies to the case where banks default when S =s1, whileequa-
tion (3.7) applies to the case where banks default when S =s2. Ifprofits are
positive in both states of the world, the bank is fully hedged, and Rb =R*.Im-
plicit in these conditions is the assumption that bank loans and forward operations
are publicly observable.
Consider an economy with government guarantees that apply only to the de-
valuation state. Then Rb is still determined by (3.6) when 7r (si, Rb) <0and
ir(s2,Rb)> 0, so that since default occurs when S =s1. However,if 7r(si,Rb)> 0
and ir(s2,Rb)< 0, then default occurs when S =s2, andthe government ensures
that foreign creditors get paid in full.'5 It follows that in the presence of guaran-
tees, foreigners are willing to make loans to a domestic bank at the rate Rb =R*,
as long as the bank pursues a loan/hedge policy that is consistent with default
occurring only when the exchange rate is devalued.
Finally, regardless of whether there are government gfiarantees we assume
that banks choose x and L subject to the constraint that forward contracts can
be honored in all states of the world. This implies that
if(s,Rb) <0 then (1—A) [RL_(L)+ (1—)K+x( —I)]￿w,
(3.8)
so that the bank's residual value net of bankruptcy costs is nonnegative after
the settlement of forward contracts whether or not the currency is devalued. We
'5As discussed by Merton (1987) in the context of deposit insurance, these guarantees can be
interpreted as a free put option provided by the government to banks.
12will refer to (3.8) as the 'no default on forward contracts' condition. Note that
this constraint does not apply to fully hedged banks (where both r (si, Rb)and
7r(s2,Rb)are positive), since for those financial institutions default is not an issue.




—(L)+ (1— 5)K —ECB(x,L), (3.9)
where ECB(x, L) is the expected cost of borrowing. To see this consider a bank
for whom it is optimal to default when S S2. Its expected profit is given by:
V= (l-p) [SlRa (11)]
Adding and subtracting p [L —(L)+ (1 —o)K]+ px (1/F —1/S2), com-
bining the terms that multiply RaL, and using the fact that expected profits on
forward contracts are zero we obtain equation (3.9).
In general ECB(x, L) is the probability of not defaulting times RbL plus the
probability of defaulting times the residual assets of the bank. For example, in
the case of a bank with a hedging strategy such that it is optimal to default when
S =s2the expected cost of borrowing is given by:
ECB(x, L) =(1
—p)RbL+p [RaL —(L)+ (1 —ö)K+ x (—
(3.10)
When the bank does not default, which occurs with probability (1 —p),it repays
RbL to foreign creditors. If it defaults, the bank hands over (si/s2)RaL —b(L)+
(1 —)K+ x(1/F —1/s2)to its creditors. But because of bankruptcy costs the
creditors receive less than this. They only receive what is left over after the
bankruptcy costs are incurred: (1 —.X)[(s1/s2)R'L
—L(L)+ (1 —6)K+ x(1/F —
1/82)]-w.
Throughoutthe paper we will see that it is possible to gather intuition about
the optimal bank hedging strategy by deriving the value of x that minimizes the
expected cost of borrowing, ECB(x, L), for a given loan size L.
134. Optimal Bank Hedging when Loans are Pre-determined
To hone our intuition about the effects of government guarantees it is useful to
start by considering the case where the amount of real lending, L, is exogenollsly
fixed. Given this assumption, a bank's only decision is how much exchange rate
risk to hedge. In this section we prove two propositions: (i) it is optimal for a
bank to fully hedge exchange rate risk when there are no government guarantees;
and (ii) it is not optimal for a bank to hedge exchange rate risk in the presence of
government guarantees. These propositions mirror the classic results in Kareken
and Wallace (1978) on the impact of deposit insurance on banks' optimal portfolio
decisions. While the nature of government guarantees are different in the two
analyses, both our results and those of Kareken and Wallace (1978) are driven
by: (i) the presence of bankruptcy costs, and (ii) the ability of banks to make
portfolio decisions that minimize the value of their assets in bankruptcy states.




Total bank profits from both lending and hedging activities can be written as:
—
Proposition4.1. In an economy with no government guarantees, L fixed and
(3.8)satisfied,complete hedging is optimal for 0 <A<1.When A == 0the
Modigliani-Miller theorem applies and the bank is indifferent between hedging
and not hedging.
Proof: Expected profit for a fully hedged bank is given by
VH=(1
—p)max{ir(si, R*), 0} +pmax{ir(s2, R*), 0}
=(1_p)7r(sl,R*) +prr(s2,R*)
=(1_p)L(s1,R*)+p(s2,R*). (4.1)
14where the second line follows from the fact that total profits are positive in both
states of the world for a fully-hedged bank. The third line results from the risk-
neutral pricing of forward contracts, which implies that the expected value of the
bank's forward position is zero.
The expected profit of a bank that chooses not to be fully hedged and to go
bankrupt when S s2 is given by
V'= (1 — p)7r(si, Rb) (4.2)
= (l—p)7r(si,R)+x——
= (1_p)[(sl,R*)+R*L_RbL+x(_)].
The equation that determines the borrowing rate for this bank implies
(1 —p)RbL=R*L—— ) [3 R*) +R*L + —)] +pw.
Hence




Therefore, the bank will choose the lowest value of x consistent with the no default
on forward contracts condition, (3.8):
This value of x reduces the residual value of the bank to zero and implies that
the borrowing rate is R"R*/(1 —p).Using these two facts in (4.2) we obtain
This implies that full hedging dominates any strategy consistent with default in
the devaluation state.
15To complete the proof we need to show that full hedging also dominates any
strategy in which the bank defaults in the no-devaluation state. A similar argu-
ment to the one above can be used to show that the best strategy of this type
involves setting x to the maximal value consistent with the no default on forward
contracts conditioll, (3.8). Expected profit evaluated at this value of x, which we
denote by V", is given by
V11 =VH—(1)
A (4.3)
Thus, the best strategy that involves default in the no devaluation state is domi-
nated by full hedging.
If w= 0,VH =V'=V".If, in addition, A =0then the Modigliani-Miller
theorem applies to any feasible hedging strategy.•
The basic intuition for this result is straightforward. The expected cost of
borrowing for a hedged bank is R*L. For a bank that defaults in the devaluation
state the expected cost of borrowing is given by (3.10), while its borrowing rate,
Rb,isgiven by (3.7). Using these two equations it can be shown that the bank's
expected cost of borrowing is minimized if it leaves just enough residual value
when S =2 toallow its foreign creditors to pay the fixed cost of bankruptcy.
Thus it sets x such that:
RL -(L)+ (1- )K + x (!_= . (4.4)
S2 \F82)1—A
In this case, the bank's borrowing rate will be Rb =R*/(1
—p),and its expected
cost of borrowing will be RtL + pw/(1 —A).Similarly it can be shown that the
minimum expected cost of borrowing for a bank that defaults when S =iis
ECB =R*L+ (1 —p)w/(1
—A).In both cases, when w is strictly positive, the
expected cost of borrowing is greater than R* for a bank that is not hedged and
equal to Rt for a fully hedged bank.
Proposition 4.2. Consider an economy with government guarantees and L fixed.
Suppose that: 0 < A < 1, 0 < w<(J —A)R*Land equation (3.8) is satisfied.
16Then full hedging is not optimal and the optimal strategy is to set x to its lowest
permissible bound.
Proof: If the bank is not fully hedged. and defaults when S =s2,its expected
profit is given by (1 _.) [L(51 R*) + x (1/F — 1/si)]. This expression is strictly
decreasing in x. So it is optimal for such a bank to set x to its lowest permissible
value. It follows that the maximal profits of a nonhedged bank are equal to
V1 =VH+ p[R*L — 4(1 — A)] > VH. Here VH, giren by (4.1), denotes the
expected profits of a fully hedged bank. Finally, to show that it is not optimal to
choose a hedging strategy consistent with default in the no devalilation state, note
that government guarantees do not apply in this state. Consequently, expected
profit is given by (4.3), so that this strategy is dominated by full hedging.•
To obtain intuition for this result, note that the expected cost of borrowing
for a fully hedged bank is R*L. If the bank is not fully hedged and there are
government guarantees the expected cost of borrowing is:
ECB=(1_P)R*L+P[siL_(L)+(1_ö)K+x(_)].
By setting x to the lowest permissible value consistent with the no default on
forward contracts condition, (3.8) this cost is reduced to (1 — p)R*L + pw/(1 —
A) ,which is lower than R*L under our assumption that the fixed cost of bankruptcy,
w, is strictly positive but smaller than (1 — A)R*L.
Note that with government guarantees, banks that aren't fully hedged go
bankrupt in the devaluation state. Since the lowest permissible value of x is neg-
ative, they adopt a hedging strategy that involves selling dollars forward. While
this might be characterized as reckless speculation, it is simply the optimal re-
sponse of banks to government guarantees when there are bankruptcy costs.
We conclude this section by asking the question: would banks prefer to make
dollar-denominated loans? The answer is no. It is straightforward to show that
without government guarantees banks with dollar-denominating loans will not
choose to go bankrupt. As a result, their expected cost of borrowing will be R*L,
17regardless of whether they make their loans in dollars or not. Under guarantees,
banks are also indifferent between making dollar denominated loans and non-
indexed loans in local currency. We can show that banks that denominate their
loans in dollars choose to go bankrupt when there is a devaluation. Their optimal
hedging strategy will involve a more negative value of x, so as to ensure that the
residual value of their assets in the devaluation state will equal zero. Given this
strategy their expected cost of borrowing continues to be (1 _p)R*L+p/(1 —A).
5. Equilibrium in the Banking Industry
In this section we characterize the equilibrium of the banking industry assuming
an exogenous demand schedule for bank loans. Our objective here is to study the
impact of government guarantees on the hedging behavior of the banking industry.
As it turns out doing so is substantially more complex than the task confronted
in the previous section. This is because banks must choose how many loans to
produce at the same time as their hedging strategy.
Suppose that the total demand for bank loans is given by the function D(R)
which is assumed to be nonnegative and nonincreasing in R. Consider the equilib-
rium of the banking industry with no government guarantees. The representative
bank's problem is to choose (x, L) to maximize V, given by (3.5), subject to (3.6),
(3.7), and (3.8).
Definition. An equilibrium for the banking industry is a value for R, a schedule,
Rb(x, L), a level of hedging, x, a level of lending L, and a number of banks B such
that when banks take R" and the schedule Rb(x, L) as given, (1) the pair (x, L),
maximizes the bank's expected profit, (ii) the bank's expected profit is R*K, and
(iii) the market for bank loans clears, LB =D(Ra).
We now characterize the equilibrium of an economy with no government guar-
antees.
Proposition 5.1. Suppose that (1 —6)K—(O) >0.The equilibrium of an econ-
omy with no government guarantees is unique and has the following properties.
18First, the equilibrium level of lending, L, is given by the unique solution to
—)(L,) + (1 —8)K =R*K. (5.1)
Second,the equilibrium value of R L
F R =— [Rt+ '(La)]. (5.2)




Fourth, the equilibrium value of Rb =R*.
Here we sketch the proof of the previous proposition, and refer the reader to
the Appendix for a formal proof. The no default on forward contracts condition,
(3.8), defines the setof combinations (x, L) that are permissible. Constraints
(3.6) and (3.7) make it convenient to partitioninto four disjoint subsets: (i)
is the set of points in which ir(s, R*) ￿ 0 for i =1,2,(ii) 2isthe set of points
in which ir(si, Rb) >0, ir(s2,Rb) < 0 and Rb is given by (3.7), (iii) Q3 is the set
of points in which ir(si, Rb) <0,ir(s2, Rb) ￿ 0, and Rb is given by (3.6), and (iv)
24is —Ul2Ul3. Thecondition (1 —6)K
—(0)>0is used to guarantee
that there exist (x, L) with L >0.





For (x, L) E Q2, the expected profit of a bank is given by
(1- )
[RaL-RbL+ (1- ö)K -(L)+ x (- i)]. (5.4)
19Using (3.7) to replace Rb in the previous expression, we can show that V2 is strictly
decreasing in x. Thus for an arbitrary value of L, V2 is maximized when x equals
the lowest value consistent with the no default on forward contracts condition,
(3.8). Setting x to its optimal value we can write V2 as
V2=RaL_R*L+(1_ö)K_(L)_p1.
For (x, L) E Q3, the expected profit of a bank is given by
V3=p[RL_RbL+(1_8)K_(L)+x( _)]. Fs2
Using(3.6) to replace Rb in the previous expression, we can show that V3 is strictly
increasing in x. Thus for an arbitrary value of L, V3 is maximized when x equals
the highest value consistent with the no default on forward contracts condition,







Note that for any given L, V <Vi,i =2,3.In the Appendix we establish that the
set of admissible values of L in ftcontainsthe sets of admissible values of L in ft
and13forany R. Taken together these results imply that it is not optimal for a
bank to choose (x, L) eR, i=2,3.Finally note that for (x, L) eft. ir(S,Rb) is
negative in both states of the world and the expected profit of a bank is V4 =0.
Note that for L =0,V1 =(1
—6)K
—L'(0)>0.So it can never be optimal to
choose (x, L) in ft.
Wenow characterize the optimal (x, L) in ft.Thebank's first order condition
for L is given by
Ra=
Replacing R in V1 with this expression we find that the maximal value of V1
is 5'(L)L —)(L) + (1 —5)K. Free entry implies that equilibrium profits equal
R*K. Hence (5.1) and (5.2) jointly characterize the equilibrium values of R and
20L. Note that for x to be consistent with full hedging, x must lie between X and
X. Finally, the number of banks, B, is determined by B =D(Ra)/L.
We now characterize the equilibrium of an economy with government guaran-
tees.
Proposition 5.2. Suppose that (1 —ö)K
—O)>0and <(1
—
Theequilibrium of an economy with government guarantees is unique and has
the following properties. First, the equilibrium level of lending, Lg, is the unique
solution to
'(Lg)Lg —(L9)+ (1 —8)K
p1
=R*K. (5.6)
Second, the equilibrium value of R' s
R= [(1_p)R*+(Lg)]. (5.7)
Third, the equilibrium level of x is the minimum permissible value consistent with
(3.8) for S =s2.Fourth, the equilibrium value of Rb =R*.
Here we sketch the proof of the previous proposition. We refer the reader to
the Appendix for a formal proof. As before it is convenient to partition Q into
four disjoint subsets. Sets 13andft. are defined as before. We define Q2 as
the set of points in which ir(si,R*) > 0, r(s2,R) <0.Note that for a given
value of R, V1 and V3 are still given by (5.3) and (5.5). It also remains true
that 0.Proceeding as before, we can eliminate (x, L) pairs in Q3 and f24 as
potential equilibria. The value of V2 is now given by
V2=(1_p)[RaL_R*L+(1_6)K_(L)+x( _)].
Thedifference relative to (5.4) is that the borrowing rate is now R*. Clearly,
V2 is strictly decreasing in x. Thus for an arbitrary value of L, V2 is maximized
when x equals the lowest value consistent with the no default on forward contracts
21condition, (3.8). The resulting value of V2 is
V2 =RL—(1 _p)R*L+(1 —8)K —(L) —p1
=
Vl+P(R*L_1WA).
Since we assumed that fixed bankruptcy costs are small enough that w< (1—
wehave that V2 >V1for all L ￿ L. In a full hedging equilibrium L =L.
Given this value of L an individual bank could, by changing its hedging strategy,
obtain an expected profit of V2 >V1.Therefore a full hedging equilibrium does
not exist.
The value of L that maximizes V2 is given by:
=(1_p)R* +'(L).
The maximal value of V2 is given by '(L)L —(L)+ (1 —t'i) K—p1--.In
equilibrium the free entry condition ensures that V2 =R*K.This in turn implies
that if w< (1—))R*Lthe equilibrium level of lending is a value L9 >L
that satisfies equation (5.6). Finally, the number of banks is determined by B =
D(Ra)/L.
We will now compare the value of R in economies with and without govern-
ment guarantees.
Corollary 5.3. For sufficiently small w the ask interest rate is lower in an econ-
omy with guarantees than in one without guarantees (R <R).
Proof: Equations (5.2) and (5.7) imply that:
-R=[_pR*+ '(L9) -
Equations(5.6) and (5.1) imply that lim Lg =L.This implies that urn
226. Effects of Banking Regulation
6.1. Capital Requirements
In the previous section we argued that government guarantees make the banking
system more fragile: banks adopt loan/hedging strategies which make it optimal
for them to go bankrupt after a devaluation. In some environments, imposing
capital requirements on banks can reduce the probability of bankruptcy. This is
not the case in our model, once we take into account banks' hedging strategies.
Recall that banks must commit K units of capital to operate, of which they
retrieve (1 —ö)Kat the end of the period if they do not default. Suppose that the
government imposes capital requirements of the following form. In the beginning
of the period a bank must place K' units of capital with the government, which
it retrieves if they do not default. If the bank defaults it forfeits the right to K'.
One can show this policy generates a rise in the amount that each individual bank
lends and, in an economy with guarantees, a rise in R. This in turn implies that
aggregate lending and the number of banks decline in response to the policy.'6
It might be thought that these contractionary effects are worth bearing if
capital requirements affected the probability of bank default. But they do not.
There does exist a K' large enough that an unhedged bank (x =0)would never
choose to default. In this sense capital requirements can be seen as a substitute
for hedging. But when banks are free to choose their own hedging position, they
will undo the effects of capital requirements. In particular, in an economy with
guarantees, banks will choose a lower value of x such that the residual value of
the bank (inclusive of K') will be zero in the devaluation state.
16These results are similar to those obtained by Kareken and Wallace (1978) who analyze
the effect of imposing capital requirement on fractional reserve banks in the presence of deposit
insurance.
236.2. Non-contingent Government Guarantees
In this subsection we show that the response of the banking system to government
guarantees depends sensitively on their design. In particular when guarantees
apply to all states of the world, incentives are so distorted that banks may find
it optimal to pursue loan/hedge strategies that lead them to default in the likely
event that a devaluation does not occur. This is the case when devaluations occur
with low probability. We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1. Suppose that the government guarantees foreign loans for S =
s1and S = Inaddition assume that p <1/2and w <(1
—A)R*L.Then
there is a unique equilibrium in which banks default when S =si Inaddition,
for sufficiently small ,theequilibrium ask rate, R is lower than R
A formal proof of this proposition is contained in the Appendix. Here we
describe the basic intuition behind the result. The expected cost of borrowing for
a bank that defaults when a devaluation occurs is given by:
ECB =(1
—P)R*L+ p [RaL —(L)+ (1 —6)K+ x (— i)].(6.1)
This can be minimized by setting x to the lowest value consistent with the no
default on forward contracts condition, (3.8). The resulting minimal value of
ECB is given by
ECB=(1_p)R*L+p1.
In contrast the expected cost of borrowing for a bank that defaults when a
devaluation does not occur is given by:
ECB =PR*L+ (1 —p) [RaL —(L)+ (1— 6)K + x (— I)]. (6.2)
This cost can be minimized by setting x to the highest possible value consistent
with the no default on forward contracts condition, (3.8). The resulting expected
cost is:
24ECB=pR*L+(1_p)lA. (6.3)
For wsufficientlysmall and p <i—pthe strategy that involves going bankrupt
in the no devaluation state yields a lower expected cost of borrowing. To see
why R can be smaller in this equilibrium than in an economy with guarantees
contingent on S =2, notethat the equilibrium value of R is given by:
=F
R4 + '(L)]. (6.4)
It can be shown that as w —0the equilibrium value of L converges to L9.
Comparing (6.4) with (5.7) it follows that if p <1—p,thenR is lower than R.
In summary, providing uncontingent guarantees lowers the ask interest rate
and creates a lending boom. However, it also makes the financial system extremely
fragile in the sense that banks survive only in the unlikely event that the currency
is devalued. If nothing else this strongly suggests that if, for some reason, a
government feels compelled to provide loan guarantees, these should be made
contingent on a devaluation occurring.
7. Introducing Real Uncertainty
In this section we analyze the effects of government guarantees when exchange
rate risk takes the form of lower repayment rates on the loans made by banks to
firms in the devaluation state. To focus our analysis we abstract from the type
of risk analyzed in the previous section, namely the risk that arises when banks
borrow dollars but lend domestic currency. As we show below, our basic results
do not depend on which type of exchange rate risk we consider.
Suppose that in any given period a fraction 1 of the firms repay their bank
loans. To simplify we assume that '1 can take on only two values: 1{,1}where
<1.To concentrate on the effect of bankruptcies associated with devaluations
we suppose that Pr(1 == Si) = 0.To allow for imperfect correlation between
25exchange rate devaluations and firm bankruptcies we assume that Pr( =qS=
82) = q.
We define profits to be,S,Rb) =RL—RbL—(L)+ (1 —)K+ —
Asbefore we restrict x to take on values such that the bank will be able to settle
its forward position in all states of the world:
if (,S,Rb)<0then (1 —A)[RaL —(L)+ (1 —6)K+ x( —
(7.1)
As in section 4, we consider the case in which the quantity of bank loans L is
fixed. Since our results hold for any value of L they can readily be generalized
to the case where L is endogenous. The effect of guarantees on bank hedging
strategies is summarized by the following two propositions.
Proposition 7.1. Consider an economy in which there are no guarantees. Sup-
pose L is fixed, 0 <A<1and condition (7.1) is satisfied. Then fully hedging
loan default risk, whenever feasible, is optimal.
Proof: See Appendix.
We now discuss the intuition underlying this proposition. Under full hedging
the expected cost of borrowing is R*L. There are three alternatives to full hedging:
strategy I is to default when S =2 regardlessof the value of 1; strategy II is
to default when S =s2and 1 =;strategyIII is to default when S =s1.




26so that the optimal strategy is to reduce the residual value of the bank when
= to zero. Note that we cannot reduce the residual value of the bank when
=1to zero since that would violate (7.1) when= . Thisjust means that
cross-hedging loan repayment risk with forward contracts on the exchange rate is
less efficient that if banks could use a hedging instrument with payoffs contingent
on .Giventhe optimal value of x we have
R*L =(1_p)RbL +p(l —q)(1
— — )RaL.
The expected cost of borrowing under strategy I is
ECB1(1_p)RbL+pq[RaL+(1_6)K_(L)+x(_i)]+
p(l -q) [RaL+ (1 -6)K- (L) +x (-
= (1_p)RbL+pq1+p(1_q)[1+(1_)RaL]
=R*L+p(1_q)(1_)RaL+p1W.
Under strategy II we have
R*L =(1
—pq)RbL+pq {(i —) [RaL+ (1 —6) K —(L)+ x (—
— w}
so that the optimal strategy is to choose the smallest x consistent with strategy
II. Notice that this value of x can be no less than the smallest x consistent with




Under strategy III we have
R*L=PRbL+(1_P){(1_A)[RaL+(1_6)K_(L)+x(_)] _}
27so that the optimal strategy is to reduce the residual value of the firm in the no
devaluation state to zero. So we have
R*L =PRbL




Comparing these three strategies we conclude that full hedging minimizes the
expected cost of borrowing.
Proposition 7.2. Consider an economy with guarantees. Suppose L is fixed,
w<(1 —A)R*L, 0 < A < 1 and the condition (7.1) is satisfied. Then it is not
optimal for banks to fully hedge loan default risk.
Proof: See Appendix.
The logic behind this proposition can be explained as follows. The expected
cost of borrowing under full hedging is R*L. If
(7.2)






28It turns out that when (7.2) holds, the lowest value of x consistent with strategy
II implies that
ECB1 <ECB11R*L —pq(1— )RL<RL
so that strategy I is optimal.
When (7.2) does not hold, strategy I is not feasible. The expected cost of




As before, for strategy III we have
ECBiii=R*L+(1_p)1 >RtL
So, we have shown that if w <(1
—A)R*L, full hedging is not optimal, since it is
dominated by strategy I and/or strategy II.
We conclude that for any admissible L it is not optimal to fully hedge. It
follows that if L is endogenous, full hedging will continue to be a dominated
strategy.
8. Macroeconomic Implications
In this section we embed our banking model into a general equilibrium environ-
ment. This allows us to endogenize the demand for bank loans, D(Ra), and derive
the equilibrium implications of government guarantees for output, employment,
real wages, and interest rates. Throughout this section we concentrate on the
type of exchange risk analyzed in Sections 3 and 4 and abstract from loan default
on the part of firms. It would be straightforward to accommodate the latter.
298.1. The Model Economy
Before describing the detailed problems of the agents in the economy we provide
an overview of the timing of their interactions. This timing was chosen so that
banks face exchange rate risk and there are no wage rigidities. We abstract from
labor market imperfections to focus on the role of banking frictions per se in our
model economy.17 With this in mind we divide each period into three subperiods.
In subperiod 1 banks borrow funds from abroad, enter into forward contracts
and make loans to firms. In addition firms hire labor at a market clearing real
wage rate and enter into forward contracts. Finally the household makes its
portfolio decisions. In subperiod 2, the exchange rate is realized, forward contracts
are settled and firms pay labor in units of the local currency. In subperiod 3
production and consumption occur. In addition bankruptcy costs, if any, are
incurred and foreign loans are repaid.
Households
There is a continuum of unit measure of identical households who maximize
utility defined over sequences of consumption, C,, and labor supply, Ht:
U=Eotu(Ct,Ht), O<<1.
Here E0 denotes the expectation conditional on the representative household's
time zero information set. In order to obtain analytical results we make three
simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that momentary utility takes the form:
u(Ct, kIt) =log(Ct
— > 1.
The advantage of this specification is that the labor supply depends only on the
real wage rate (see (8.1) below). Second, we assume that the household's real
financial wealth, at, is invested in a perfectly diversified international portfolio
'70t her things equal the presence of nominal wage rigidities would generate upwards pressure
on aggregate employment and output following a devaluation. This is because the real wage
would fall if the domestic price level rose.
30that yields a constant dollar-denominated gross rate of return R*. Both domestic
firms and banks are part of this portfolio and the risk associated with their returns
is perfectly diversifiable. Under these assumptions, the budget constraint of the
representative household is:
1d
+=—f- +R*at + wtHt —Ct+ t•
The variable 'rtrepresentslump sum transfers from the government, Ilv[td denotes
money holdings at the beginning of period t, Wt is the time t real wage rate, and
Pt denotes the time t price level.
The household faces a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption:
PtCt <M + PtwHt.
Throughout we assume that R* > 1, so that this previous constraint holds with
equality.
It is useful to note that the household's first order condition for II implies:
kit= (8.1)
so that 1/(77 —1)is the elasticity of labor supply.
Output Producers
There is a continuum of measure N perfectly competitive firms each of which
produces the single consumption good in the economy using labor, h, according
to the following decreasing returns to scale technology:
y =f(h)
—(, (8.2)
Here f'(h) > 0, f"(h) < 0, f(0) =0and f'(O) =oc.The parameter (>0
represents a fixed cost of production.
Before the exchange rate is realized, firms hire labor in a competitive spot
market at the real wage rate w =W/P.Firms borrow d units of local currency
31from banks at the gross interest rate R, and sell x1 units of the local currency in
the forward market. We impose the restriction that the firm must have in hand
a sufficient amount of the local currency to pay its nominal wage bill, Wh, at the
end of the period, regardless of the realized value of the exchange rate. This is
equivalent to the restriction:
wh+xf(_)
VS. (8.3)
Thefirm's real profit, lrf,isgiven by:
=f(h)-- wh-(R-+x1 (- ). (8.4)
The representative firm's problem is to maximize expected profit
E1 =f(h)-- wh-(R-1)
subject to (8.3).
Under the fixed exchange rate, since borrowing is costly, the constraint (8.3)
will hold with equality for all possible S. Evaluating (8.3) at S equal to s1 and
2,weobtain a system of two equations in d and Solvingthis system yields
d =xl=Fwh.Once a devaluation occurs, there is no uncertainty, and from then
on the forward rate is the same as the future spot rate, i.e. F =S,and we have
d=Fwh=Swh.
Under either exchange rate regime, substituting d =Fwhinto (8.4) we see
that the firm chooses h to maximize
E7r1 =f(h)
—— R"wh.
The first order condition for h implies:
f'(h) =R"w. (8.5)
32Banks
The maximization problem of the representative bank is specified in section 4.
Co verriment
The money supply, Af5', follows a stochastic process governed by the stochastic
process for the exchange rate regime described in Section 3. In the fixed exchange
rate regime, et =1,the money supply follows a deterministic sequence TS=
M1such that S =s1.In the devaluation regime the money supply follows a
deterministic sequence, M? =M2,such that the exchange rate is St =
wheret is the date at which the devaluation regime begins.
The government's budget constraint is:
I(M1
—M1t)/si for t < t
=(M2t+i
—M2)/s2
—Ffor t =t* (8.6)
(M+i —2)/(2yt_t*)fort > t
with M1 =M2.,where F is the payment made to the bank's foreign creditors
when a devaluation takes place. In the absence of government guarantees F =0.
In an economy with guarantees F is given by:18
F=BR*L_B{(1_) [R 1L (L)+(1 )k+ (11)] _}
(8.7)
Recall that B denotes the number of banks. Consequently the first term on the
right hand side of (8.7),BR*L,is the total dollar amount owed by domestic banks
to foreign creditors. The second term represents the total residual value of the
domestic bank system in the bankruptcy state, net of bankruptcy costs.
Equilibrium
We assume free entry into the goods producing sector, so that:
Eir1 =0. (8.8)
Labor market clearing implies:
'8To economize on notation we wrote this equation for the case in which banks default in the
devaluation state, since that is the scenario we focus on.
33Nh =H. (8.9)
The total supply of goods is given by:
Y=yN. (8.10)
We now provide a definition of the equilibrium of our model economy which
applies both to economies with and without government guarantees.
Definition. An eqnilibriurn is a set of stochastic processes for
(1) the household's decision variables {C, H, at+i,
(ii) the firm's employment, borrowing and hedging decisions {h, d, x};
(iii) the bank's loan and hedging decisions {L, xt};
(iv) the government policy variables {M, rt};
(v)the number of banks, B, and the number of output firms, Nt; and
(vi) the real wage, Wt,theprice level, Pt, the forward exchange rate, F, and the
interest rate, R, with the following properties.
(a) the government budget constraint (8.6) holds,
(b) {C, Iii, at+i, solve the household's problem given {Wt,Pt,t}o;
(c){h, d, x}'i0 solves the firm's problem given {Wt, Pt, R}i0;
(d) {L, Xt}0 solve the bank's problem given {R, P, St}0;
(e) the PPP condition (3.1) holds;
(f) the forward currency market clears (3.3);
(g) the money market clears, MtS =M;
(h) the exchange rate path is given by (3.2);
(i) the labor market clearing condition (8.9) holds;
(j)thecredit market clears, S.1BL =NtFtwtht;
(k) the free entry conditions in the banking sector holds: V =R*K,where V is
given by (3.5);
(1) the free entry condition in the output sector, (8.8), holds.
348.2. Characterizing the Equilibrium
In this subsection we characterize the equilibrium of the model economy with and
without government guarantees. Given our assumption that households can bor-
row and lend in world capital markets at rate R*, production and consumption
decisions ca be decoupled. In particular, we can solve for equilibrium employ-
ment, H, output, Y, real wages, w, and the interest rate, R, without deriving
the equilibrium stochastic processes for consumption and the money supply.'9 As
emphasized in the introduction, the focus of this paper is on the effects of gov-
ernment guarantees on the banking industry and on aggregate economic activity.
Accordingly, we restrict ourselves to characterizing the behavior of H, Y, w, and
Ra.
For the versions of the model with and without government guarantees, we
proceed as follows. We first derive an equilibrium demand schedule that relates the
demand for loans to R, We then use our previous analysis of the banking system
to determine the equilibrium value of R. Finally, we show how government
guarantees influence the equilibrium values of H, Y, w, and R.
To derive the equilibrium relationship between the total demand for loans and
R note that (8.4), (8.5) and (8.8) imply that the equilibrium number of hours
employed by each firm is the solution to:
f(h) —f'(h)h=. (8.11)
Given h and R, equation (8.5) determines the real wage, Wt =f'(h)/R,which
in turn determines total labor supply via relation (8.1), k! =[f'(h)/RJ''.
Since Nh =Hwe then obtain the number of firms N =[f'(h)/R]''/h.
The demand for loans in units of local currency is Since loans are made
prior to the realization of the time t exchange rate, the demand for loans in units
of foreign currency is Nd/S_,. Substituting in the fact that d =Fwhand the
'9For an analysis of consumption in an open economy model where government policy follows
a regime switching process similar to ours see Calvo and Drazen (1998).





where h is the solution to (8.11). Since i>1, D'(R') < 0, which is consistent
with our industry equilibrium analysis. Notice that
F I fort<tt =(l-p)+p —
(8.13) S_1 1.-y fort>t*.
In Section 4 we showed that the loans per bank, L,andRare determined
bythe equilibrium of the banking industry. Withnoguarantees these are given
by equations (5.1) and (5.2), respectively. With guarantees they are given by
(5.6) and (5.7),respectively.The equilibrium amount of loans in the economy is
determinedby substituting either (5.7) or (5.2) in (8.12), depending on whether
or not there are government guarantees.
Given the equilibrium value of D(R') and the loans per bank, L, we can
determine the number of banks as
B=D(R)
(8.14)
Given the previous results, the equilibrium stochastic processes for consump-
tion, the price level, and the money supply process consistent with (3.2) can be
characterized by solving the household's problem as well as imposing PPP and
money market clearing.
8.3. The Effects of A Devaluation
Consider first a situation withno government guarantees. Since banks are fully
hedgedno bankruptcies occur when a devaluation takes place. There is no uncer-
tainty from time t on so, after the devaluation, banks can borrow at rate R* and
their objective function is given by:
V=RL_R*L_b(L)+(1_o)K.
36Here R is the value of R' after the devaluation. The first order condition for L
implies that the post-devaluation borrowing rate is a constant
=y[R*+ '(L)]. (8.15)
Here we used the fact that S/S_1 ="yand the fact that the value of L is still
given by:
l,IY(L)L_(L)+(l_6)K=R*K,
and is unaffected by the devaluation. Proceeding as above we can deduce the
equilibrium level of output, real wages and employment. Recall that prior to the
devaluation R is given by (5.2), which can be written as:
[R*+(L)]. (1 —p)'y+p
Since'y >litfollows that R >R.Equations (8.12), (8.14) and (8.13) imply that
the total demand for loans and the number of banks decline after a devaluation:
D(Ra) =[(1
—p) + -l/(-l)D(Ra).
Equations (8.11) and (8.2) imply that h and y are invariant. Considered sequen-
tially. equations (8.5), (8.1), (8.9), and (8.10) imply that real wages, employment,
the number of firms in the output sector and aggregate output fall.
Now consider the situation in which there are government guarantees. Since
banks are not hedged they declare bankruptcy when a devaluation occurs, so that





where for warbitrarilyclose to zero Lg L.
Since there is no uncertainty after the devaluation, government guarantees
play no role in the economy, so that R is given by (8.15). Because the interest
37rate is lower to start with in the economy with government guarantees, the rise
R when a devaluation takes place is larger in an economy with government
guarantees. It follows that the severity of the declines in real wages, employment,
the number of banks, the number of firms, and aggregate output are all larger in
an economy with guarantees.
9. Conclusions
This paper analyzed the connection between exchange rate devaluations and
banks' hedging behavior. We argued that the presence of government guaran-
tees to banks' creditors completely eliminates banks incentives to hedge exchange
rate risk. So while the policy lowers the interest rate on bank loans and raises
aggregate output, it comes at a cost. The banking system becomes fragile. In the
event of a devaluation, banks renege on their debt and go bankrupt.
We conclude by discussing some shortcomings of our analysis. To preserve
the analytical tractability of our model we made several important simplifying
assumptions. First, we assumed that there is no uncertainty about the exchange
rate path once a devaluation occurs: the currency depreciates at rate y per unit
of time. Aside from the counterfactual nature of this assumption, it implies that
economies with and without guarantees look identical once the devaluation oc-
curs. This would not be the case if there was ongoing exchange rate uncertainty.
Second, we assumed that devaluations are exogenous events, whose probability
is unrelated to the state of the economy. While this assumption was useful, it
abstracts from the very real possibility that the state of a country's banking sys-
tem affects speculators incentives to attack a currency as well as a government's
incentives to defend it. We are exploring these connections in ongoing research.
Finally, we did not address the question of why governments often provide implicit
guarantees to banks. We suspect that the answer is related to our model's predic-
tion that such policies generate booms in aggregate activity. Understanding why
policymakers focus on this benefit (as well as others not discussed in this paper),
38rather than the costs is an important task that will no doubt involve political
economy type considerations.
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41A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 5.1
A.1.1. Preliminaries
It will be useful to define two functions
(x, LRa, Rb,s) RL
—RbL—(L)+ (1 —ö)K+ x (— ), (Al)
and
(x, LRa, S) RL —R*L—(L)+ (1 —6)K+ x (—
= (x,LRa,R*,S) (A.2)
In the proof we will occasionally drop the notation that indicates the dependence
of r and 7r* on some of their arguments.
For a given value of R, banks choose (x, L) E 1(R) to maximize
V =(1—p)max{ir(si),O} +pmax{7r(s2),O}. (A.3)
The set 1l =Q1LJ12U13Uft.2°The set ft consists of those (x, L) pairs consistent
with the bank being fully hedged, i.e. ft ={(x,L)IL￿ O,7r*(x,L) >O,VS}.
Whenthe bank is not fully-hedged, we impose the restriction that it cannot
reduce its recoverable residual value below the fixed cost of bankruptcy in either
state of the world, i.e. if ir(S)< 0then
(1- A) [RL -(L)+ (1- ö)K +- > w (A.4)
The othersets are defined as={(x,L) ftir(s)>0,ir(s)<0,(A.4)},ft =
{(x,L)ftlir(si)<0,ir(s2)>0,(A.4)}andft={(x,L) ftr(si)<0,rr(s2)<
0,(A.4)}. Before proceeding with the proof, we characterize ft.
A.1.2. Constructing ft
We can construct ft by finding the loci of points at which ir*(x,LR1 ,s)0 for
i =1and 2. These loci are illustrated in Figure 1 as X(L) and X(L).
20The sets ,i=1,2, 3, 4, depend on the ask rate R. We drop this dependence for
notational convenience.
42We have *() = 0 if
or
=(L)
(R —R*)L—(L) +(1 —6)K
The L-intercept of X(L) is at Lx, given by
(R —R*)Lx
—(Lx)+ (1 —6)K= 0.




which is greater than zero for 0 < L < L1, and is less than zero for L > L1 where
Ra —R= ,'(L1).21 And we have
= —',b"(L)<0,
from the convexity of .SoL) is concave.







The L-intercept of X(L) is at L, given by
(R —R*)
L —(Lx)+ (1 —=0.
2ljf Ra —<'(O)then L1 is undefined and X' (L) <0 for all L.







whichis less than zero for 0 L < L2 and is greater than zero for L > L2 where
Rasi/s2 —R*=J(L2).22 Noticethat since
S2
we have L <L and L2 <L1. Finally
X"(L) =
F82
> -"(L) ￿ 0
which implies that X(L) is convex. —
Somealgebra shows that the point at which X(L) and X(L) intersect is given
by a value of L such that
RaL_R*L+(1_6)K_(L)__0.
We denote this value L. — —
ConsiderFigure 1. For x <X(L), 7r*(sl) > 0, while for x > X(L), ii*(si)<0.
For x <X(L), *(S2)< 0 and for x > X(L), ir*(s2)>0. Hence the intersection
of the region below X(L) and the region above X(L) is the region in whichis
nonnegative in both states. That is,
={(a,L)x<(L), x >X(L), L ￿ o}.
Notice that Rb(x, L) =R*for all (x, L) 1. Clearlyis a convex set.23
In order to prove our propositions we do not need to fully characterize the other
three subsets: 12, 113 and 11g. In a more detailed appendix we fully characterize
these sets in order to draw the diagram in Figure 1. However, the details of this
diagram are not essential to our proof.
221f Rasi/82 —R*<'(O), then L2 is undefined and '(L)<0 for all L. —
23Thisdoes not depend on the existence of the points L1 and L2. The fact that X (L) is
concave, while(L) is convex is sufficient to make i a convex set.
44A.1.3. Solving the Bank's Problem
We can rewrite the bank's problem as
max V =maxmax V, max V, max V, max V
(x,L)EQ Ljx,L)EIui(x,L)E122(x,L)Ec23(x,L)E4
That is, for any positive R, we can separately maximize expected profits over
each of the four subsets of ft We can then compare the level of profits for each
of these four strategies, and choose the strategy among the four that yields the
highest expected profit.
Within Q1, expected profits are given by
V1(L) =RL
—R*L—J(L)+ (1— 6)K.
So, withinthe value of x is irrelevant to expected profits. Since Q1 is con-
vex, maximizing V subject to the constraint that (x, L) E 2i is equivalent to




Since [0, L+] is compact, and the second order condition for L is satisfied, if there
is a solution to the first-order condition for L <L,it will represent a profit
maximizing value of L. Such a solution would be a value of L such that
-= '(L). (A.5)
Another possibility, depending on the value of R, is that the first order con-
dition is not satisfied at any L E [0, L), in which case the optimum must be at
L =0,where V1 =(1
— — (0)>0.Notice that the optimum can never be
at L since V1(L+) =0.
Now suppose we maximize V subject to the condition that (x, L) e22. Ex-
pected profits are given by
-





3V2 (11'\ =—pI —— — j<0. ax \F 82)
Thus,given a value of L, the bank will set x to the minimum value it can take
within 2 for that L. This is
x =Y(L)RL—(L)+(1—8)K— T
If we substitute x =Y(L)into the expression for expected profits we find
V2(L) =V1(L)-p1 A
Notice that this fact, along with V1(0) >0,Vi(L) =0,Vi(L) concave, and
V2(L) >0for all (x,L) E2, implythat {L[Y(L),L] El2}C{0,L+].Conse-
quently max(X,L)E-22 V <max(X,L)E01V.
Now suppose we maximize V subject to the condition that (x, L) E Q3. Ex-
pected profits are given by
v3 =p [R L_RbL_(L)+(1_)K+x( -





av3i i =A(1 —p)(— — —) >0.
ax \Si Fj
46Thus, given a value of L, the bank will set x to the maximum value it can take
within Q3 for that L. This is
——RaL_(L)+(1_6)K_ 11
s1F
If we substitute x =Y(L)into the expression for expected profits we find
V3(L)=Vi(L)-(1-p)1.
Notice that this fact, along with V1(O) >0,V1(L+)= 0,1/1(L) concave, and
V3(L) >0for all (x, L) E Q3, imply that {L{Y(L), L] E3} c [0,L]. Conse-
quently max(XL)E3 V <max(X,L)EOlV.
For any (x, L) E Q4 expected profits are V =V4=0.Since V1(0) =(1
—
— 5(0)>0,we have max(X,L)EQ4 V <max(X,L)E1V.
Thus, the profit maximizing (x, L) E 1 for any R.
A.1.4. Equilibrium
In equilibrium V =R*K.The previous subsection showed that in equilibrium
(x, L) e .Wecannot have L =0in equilibrium since V1(0) =(1—)K—5(0)<
R*K.Hence, the only possibility is that an equilibrium with (x, L) EQ1exists in
which the first-order condition, (A.5), is satisfied and expected profits are given
by
V = — (L)+ (1 —6)K=R*K. (A.6)
Given the conditions we placed on ,thereis a unique solution to (A.6), which, it
should be noted, does not depend on Re'. So this value of L, which we denote L,
is the unique equilibrium level of lending in the absence of government guarantees.
The unique equilibrium ask rate, as determined by (A.5), is
To complete the proof we need to show that (L) X(L) so that a full hedge
is feasible. Notice that
= = F[R* + '(L)IL+RI
47and
X =X(L)=F[R* + (L)] L -RK
Clearly X >so that a full hedge is feasible.
Finally, if A =w =0,it is clear that the unhedged strategies (x, L) =
[Y(L),La], and (x, L) =[Y(L),LJ are also equilibrium strategies.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 5.2
A.2.1. Preliminaries
Under government guarantees, the sets t,andare defined in the same
way as under no guarantees. The set 12 is defined differently. Notice that under
guarantees, Rb = R* in 2•
A.2.2.Solving the Bank's Problem




For (x, L) E 22expectedprofits are given by
V2—(1—p) [RaL_R*L_(L)+(1_ö)K+x( -
Inthis case
3v21 1 =(1-p)-—) <0. F s1
Thus,given a value of L, the bank will set x to the minimum value it can take
within Q2 for that L, which, again, is x =Y(L).If we substitute x =Y(L)into
the expression for expected profits we find
V2(L)=Vi(L)+p(R*L_ 1A)
Withinmaximal expected profits for a given L are again given by
V3(L)V1(L)_(l_P)1A.
48By the same argument we used in proving Proposition 5.1, we have max(L)3 V <
max(,L)Q1 V.
Again, for any (x, L) E l4 expected profits are V =V4=0,so we have
max(X,L)EQ4 V < max(S,L)Eol V. Thus we have eliminated (x, L) E Q3 Uas
equilibrium outcomes.
A.2.3. Equilibrium
In equilibrium V =R*K.We cannot have L =0in equilibrium since V1(0) =
(1
—5)K
—0)< R*K. There are two possibilities left to consider. First, there
might be an equilibrium with (x, L) E ci1 in which the first-order condition, (A.5),
is satisfied. This is an equilibrium in which banks are fully hedged. The ask rate
must again be given by
and the level of expected profits must be
V =
RThLT.
—R*L—(L)+ (1 — = R*K.
But notice that a bank facing R could, by choosing (x, L) =[y(L),L]
obtain expected profits of
V2=V+p(R*L_
Ourassumption on wimpliesthat [Y(L), L] is a feasible point within 7l2 and
implies that V2 > V, so there cannot be an equilibrium with (x,L) E
To check whether there is an equilibrium with (x, L)l2, notice that we
can first set x =Y(L),and then choose L. The lower bound on the values of
L which are feasible in 2 is the value of L for which X(L) =Y(L),which is
=w/[Rt(1
—A)].The largest value of L which is feasible in Q2 is one for which
172(L)= 0which we denote by L. We assume, for the moment, that L < L, so
that 2 is non-null. We choose L E (L, L] to maximize V2(L).
Differentiating V2 with respect to L, we obtain the first order condition24
(1 _p)R* ='(L). (A.7)
24Since V2(L) =0,L cannot be an equilibrium. Hence, any equilibrium within 12 must satisfy
the first-order condition.
49In this case expected profits would be
V ='(L)L—(L) +(1 —6)K—p1
=RK. (A.8)
There is a unique solution, L =L9,to (A.8) such that L9 >L.Notice that this
implies Lg >L,which confirms our initial assumption that L <L.
The unique equilibrium askrate,as determined by (A.7), is
R =[(1_p)R* +'(Lg)}.
The equilibrium hedge position of the bank is
Xg= Y(Lg).
A.3. Proof of Proposition 6.1
A.3.1. Preliminaries
Under the form of government guarantees described in the proposition, the sets
2 andSi4 are defined in the same way as in the proof to Proposition 5.2.
The set ci3 is defined as differently. Notice that when the government guarantees
apply no matter which value of S is realized then, in Si3, Rb =R*.
A.3.2. Solving the Bank's Problem




For (x, L) E Si2 expected profits are again given by
V2(L)=Vi(L)+p(R*L_
For(x, L) E Si3 expected profits are given by
V3=P[RL_R*L_(L)+(1_o)K+x(_--)].
50In this case
3V371i\ =p—— — 1>0.
3x\F S2J
Thus,given a value of L, the bank will set x to the maximum value it can take
within Q3 for that L. This is x =Y(L).If we substitute x =Y(L)into the
expression for expected profits we find
V3=Vi(L)+(1_p)(R*L_ 'h).
Forany (x, L) Eexpected profits are V =V4=0.
A.3.3. Equilibrium
In equilibrium V =R*K.We cannot have (x, L) Ein equilibrium for the
same reason as in the previous propositions. There cannot be an equilibrium with
(x, L) i using the same argument used in the proof of Proposition 5.2.
There might be an equilibrium with (x, L) E 2• Notice that if there is such
an equilibrium then it must be at Lg. But notice that
v3(L9) =V2(Lg)+ (1 —2p)(R*L9 —1
Since p < 1/2 and L9 > L, we have V3(Lg) > V(Lg) =R*K.The fact that
V3(Lg) > 0, implies that Lg is feasible within Q3. Hence (x, L) E 2 cannot be an
equilibrium.
To check whether there is an equilibrium with (x, L) E I3, we differentiate V3
with respect to L, to obtain the first order condition25
—pR*=b'(L). (A.9)
In this case expected profits would be
V = — (L)+ (1 — — (1—
p)1=R*K. (A.10)
There is a unique solution, L =L,to (A.10) such that L > L9 > L.
25kn equilibrium within 23 must satisfy the first-order condition because the largest value of
L consistent with (x, L)13, where X(L) intersects Y(L), is one at which V3 =0.
51The unique equilibrium ask rate, as determined by (A.9), is
The equilibrium hedge position of the bank is
x =(L).
A.4. Proof of Proposition 7.1
If
RaL_R*L_(L)+(1_6)K+x(_) >0, v,s.
thebank is fully hedged. This will be true whenever
(R5_R*)L_(L)+(1_)K —(Ra_R*)L_(L)+(1_6)K — 11 HH 11
F S2 s1F
A sufficient condition for full hedging to be feasible is H H• This is true
whenever
[1_p(1_)1RaL_R*L_(L)+(1_6)K￿0.
There are three other potentially feasible strategies for the bank.
The bank defaults in the devaluation state whenever x <XH. The lowest value
of x < H that is feasible is one that reduces the residual value of the bank to
zero when S =s2 andJ = Notice that this is given bythe solution to
(i-A) =w.
Noticethat defaulting in the devaluation state is feasible whenever <iH which
is equivalent to w < (1 —A)R*L.
There are two distinct types of strategy for .<i <Xx. Under strategy I, the
bank defaults when S =s2 regardlessof the value of 4. Under strategy II, the
bank defaults when S =2and 4 =Clearly, strategy I involves more extreme
values of x than strategy II. The lowest value of x consistent with strategy II will
26Notice that the bank cannot reduce its residual value to zero regardless of the value of 1.
If the bank set its residual value to zero when S =2 and1 =1,its residual value would be
negative when 4
52be one for which profits when S =2 and1 =1are exactly zero, while profits
when S =sand 1 =arenegative. That is, it will be the value of x such that
RaL_RbL_(L)+(l_6)K+X( —1)
=0
when Rb is set according to
RL= (1 —pq) RbL+pq{(1 —A) [RaL+(l —)K—(L)±x (
—)]_w}.
This value, which we denote by x11 is
pqw — {[1 — pq +pq (1— A) RL —R*L+ (1 —pqA)[(1— 8)K — xII=
(1—pqA)(—)
Notice that both strategies I and II are feasible if < x <H. Only strategy
II is feasible if XH < < H Only strategy i is feasible if <H < x. Notice
that xjj<Hif
1 —pq)(1 — )RaL_pqAR*L
pq
Notice that x11 > x if
1—A
{R*L_(1_pq)(1_)RaL]. 1 — pq
Under strategy III, the bank defaults whenever S =s.This happens when
it sets XH <x < where
(1- A) [RaL + (1- )K- (L) + (- =
Whenfull hedging is feasible, the bank's expected profits are
VH =[1— pq(1 — )]RL—R*L— L) + (1 — 6)K.
A bank using strategy I (when it is feasible) defaults whenever S =s2.Hence its
expected profits are
V1 =(1-p) [RaL - RbL - (L) + (1- )K +x (-i)].
(A.11)
53The borrowing rate under strategy I is given by
R*L =(1_p)RbL+p(1_\)(1_q+q)RaL+
P{(i_A) [(1_6)K_(L)+x(_)1 -}





Since Vj is decreasing in x, the optimal strategy for the bank is to set x =x.
Combining this with (A.12) we have
Vj =[l_p[q+A(l_q)j(l_)]RaL_R*L+(l_ö)K_(L)_p1
=vH_pA(l_q)(l_)RaL_p1.
Hedging dominates strategy I.
A bank using strategy II (if it is feasible) defaults whenever S =2 and1" =5.
Hence its expected profits are
V11 =(1
—pq)[RaL —RbL—(L)+ (1 —6)K]
—pq(
— I) x(A.13)
The borrowing rate under strategy II is given by
R*L =(1—pq) RbL+pq{(l —[RaL+(l
—6)K
—(L)+x (— )] _w}.
Combining this with (A.13) we have
Vu =[1




SinceV11 is decreasing in x the optimal strategy for the bank is to set x equal
to the smallest value consistent with strategy II. This will be x =max{x, x11}.
Combining x = and (A.14) we obtain
V11[l_pq(1_)RaL_R*L_(L)+(l_6)K_pq1W
=VHP1.
54This means that for x =max{x, x11} we have Vjj < VH —pq/(1
—A)since V11 is
decreasing in x. Thus, hedging dominates strategy II.
A bank using strategy III defaults whenever S =s1. Henceits expected
profits are
VIII =p[(1 —q+ q)RaL —RbL—(L)+ (1 —6)K+ x( — (A.15)
The borrowing rate under strategy III is given by
R*L=PRbL+(1_P){(1_A)[RaL+(1_6)K_(L)+x(_)] _}
Combiningthis with (A.15) we have
Viii =1_q+q)+(1_p)(1_A)]RaL_R*L+[1_A(1_p)][(1_)K_(L)]_
A(1-p) (_)x_(i_P)w (A.16)




Hedging dominates strategy III.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 7.2
As in the proof to Proposition 7.1 the bank is fully hedged if XH x XH and
there are three other potentially feasible strategies for the bank.
The bank defaults in the devaluation state whenever x x <Xff. Notice that
defaulting in devaluation state is feasible because w<(1 —A)R*Limplies<.
StrategiesI and II are defined as before, but, because Rb =R*,X is different.
It is the lowest value of x for which profits when S =2and 4 =1are exactly
zero, while profits when S =2and 4 =arenegative. Since, with guarantees,
Rb =R*,it will be the value of x such that
55This value, which we denote by x11,9 is
XJJ,g ii F —
Itcan be shown that XIJ,g <so that strategy ii is always feasible. Only
strategy II is feasible if XII,g < <H. Notice that both strategies I and II are
feasible if < < x, or, equivalently, if
< (1 —\) [R*L
—(1
—)RaL]. (A.17)
Under strategy III, the bank defaults whenever S =i•This happens when
it sets XH < <.
When fully hedged the bank's expected profits are
VH =[1
—pq(1
—)] RcL—R*L—(L)+ (1 —6)K.
A bank using strategy I defaults whenever S =s2.Hence its expected profits are
V1 =(1-p) [RaL_ R*L_(L) + (1 -6)K+x (!- (A.18)
The optimal strategy for the bank is to set x to the lowest value it can take on,





When strategy i is feasible, (A.17) holds, which implies V1 > VH.




The optimal strategy for the bank is to set x to the lowest value it can take on,




56Combining x =xwith (A.19) we have
Vjj =[1—pq(1 —)]RaL_(1 —pq)RtL—(L) + (1— 6)K—pq1
=vH+pq(RL_l).
To summarize, when (A.17) holds V1> Vjj > VH, so strategy I dominates. When
(A.17) does not hold, strategy I is not feasible but V11 > VH. Hence, full hedging
is always dominated.




Hedging dominates strategy III.
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Figure 1
Feasible Choices of (x, L)
X(L)
/ Y(L)
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L
Y(L)